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For over two decades Ethiopia’s political federation 
has been organized around the principle of 
‘democratic centralism’. This philosophy also 
lies at the heart of the ruling Ethiopian Peoples’ 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 
coalition, and its centralized decision-making 
culture. Until recently, EPRDF policies were 
formulated through a top-down process rather than 
on the basis of local initiatives. This centralization 
has helped hold the Ethiopian state together. 
Since early 2018, Ethiopia’s political context has 
been in flux, including a deep popular challenge to 
democratic centralism, and the prevailing political 
order. In this context, reforms which strengthen 
constitutionalism and the rule of law in the 
country are increasingly urgent. 
The recent context 
Barely months after Ethiopia’s 2015 elections, 
which saw the ruling EPRDF party sweep the board 
in all federal and regional political institutions, 
anti-government protests erupted in the Oromia 
region. The protests were initially driven by Oromo 
opposition to the so-called Addis Ababa Master 
Plan—a top-down, poorly communicated plan for 
integrated development of the city—perceived to 
be administrative encroachment and absorption of 
Oromia territory by the federal government. This 
locally specific grievance resonated with growing 
national discontent with the EPRDF’s party-state. 
Protests spread across the large Oromia state and 
erupted in Amhara region too. 
The EPRDF’s securitized response—declaring a 
state of emergency (SoE) from October 2016 to 
August 2017—and internal-party reform (known 
as deep renewal) could not prevent a second 
outbreak of protests in February 2018 and another 
SoE to be instituted. This time protests also 
exposed the internal EPRDF divisions with two 
of its constituent parties—the Amhara National 
Democratic Movement (ANDM) and the Oromo 
Peoples’ Democratic Organization (OPDO)—
publicly siding with the protestors’ demands. The 
long-standing EPRDF discipline of democratic 
centralism was further eroded when significant 
numbers of EPRDF parliamentarians voted against 
the second SoE. 
The extent of the changes within the EPRDF 
was also revealed in the internal selection of 
a new party chairman, following the February 
resignation of the then chair and Ethiopia’s 
prime minister, Hailemariam Desalegn. The 
winning candidate, whom the EPRDF-dominated 
parliament then elected Prime Minister—OPDO’s 
Abiy Ahmed—had nevertheless, failed to gain 
full support of many EPRDF Council members. 
Since then the EPRDF’s four main parties have 
increasingly pursued their own objectives, which 
will undoubtedly affect the way the federal and 
constitutional systems operate. 
The risk to self-determination and 
minority rights
According to the federal constitution (Article 39) 
all nations, nationalities and peoples have a right 
to self-determination, which includes the right 
to territorial self-rule and even secession. In a 
country with more than 80 nations, nationalities 
and peoples, the EPRDF’s democratic centralist 
political hold at the centre blocked the potentially 
disintegrative effect of these provisions. While 
this political management has prevented further 
fragmentation, it has simultaneously undermined 
the constitutional provisions and constitutionalism 
in general. 
The EPRDF’s uncertain future—at least in its 
present democratic centralist form—is likely 
to prompt an avalanche of claims for self-
determination (both old and new), making it 
a priority to design constitutional mechanisms 
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that offer a better balance between diversity and 
unity. A new, potentially more plural, political 
environment will require vigorous institutional 
protection of ethnic minorities, which necessitates 
both preventive and remedial legal measures. 
The likelihood of human rights violations against 
members of ethnic minority communities can be 
reduced if political institutions, such as legislative 
and executive councils, are made ethnically 
inclusive. Presently, the political institutions of 
several regions are dominated, and in some cases 
monopolized, by single ethnic groups, on whose 
behalf the state or region has been established. 
This has generally been to the detriment of those 
individuals who identify with ethnic groups 
associated with other regional states.1
Revisions to the electoral system and designing 
constitutional tools that guarantee real minority 
participation could help to create incentives 
for political parties and politicians to behave 
moderately by making centrist attitudes electorally 
more rewarding than narrow ethnic nationalism. 
Where human rights violations do occur, effective 
mechanisms of judicial redress need to be created.
Regionally autonomous policy-making
The present political transition has precipitated a 
stronger claim to autonomy by the regional states. 
Yet the constitutional distribution of powers 
between the federal government and the regional 
states—and the autonomy of the latter—is far from 
clear. 
Article 51(2) of the constitution, for example, 
stipulates that the federal government ‘shall 
formulate and implement the country’s policies, 
strategies and plans in respect of overall economic, 
social and development matters’. The federal 
government can, as a result of this vague drafting, 
enact policies in a potentially wide range of areas. 
Yet, Article 52(2c) of the constitution stipulates 
that the regional states can also ‘formulate and 
execute economic, social and development policies, 
strategies and plans’. 
1 for a discussion of the constitutional and institutional 
developments at regional state level see:  Christophe van 
der beken, Completing the Constitutional architecture: a 
Comparative analysis of sub-national Constitutions in ethiopia, 
addis ababa, addis ababa university press, 2017, 242. 
Regional states do have policy-making autonomy, 
the scope of which is not clearly determined. 
Other similarly vague provisions relate to 
the administration of land and other natural 
resources—grievances that have driven protests 
over the past three years. 
Until recently, such indeterminate provisions have 
allowed the federal democratic centralist policy-
making to prevail over regional views, even when 
there was a clear case for more consultation as 
shown by the Addis Ababa Master Plan. Yet, with 
more assertive regional parties pursuing their 
own development objectives such acquiescence is 
unlikely to continue and risks more particularistic 
interests coming to the fore. 
A clearer division of powers between the federal 
government and the regions is necessary. The 
distribution of powers between the federal 
government and the regions needs more robust 
formalized mechanisms of intergovernmental 
relations and requires a serious revision of 
the constitutional interpretation and review 
mechanisms. 
Constitutional review and reforms
The Ethiopian constitution presently allots review 
powers to the second chamber of the federal 
parliament, the House of the Federation, rather 
than the judiciary. In principle, the House, whose 
members are representatives of the nations, 
nationalities and peoples selected by the regional 
councils, can quash government decisions that 
violate the constitution. This means that a federal-
regional dispute on the scope of federal and 
regional powers is to be settled by a representative 
organ of the regional states. In practice, since 
all regional states were dominated by core or 
affiliate EPRDF parties, such challenges were 
rare (in some cases, the House had to decide on 
the scope of federal and regional powers related 
to land administration). Entrusting the power 
of constitutional review to the judiciary would 
provide a more neutral and effective mechanism of 
managing the federal-regional relationship.
Reform of the principles of representation in 
the House of the Federation should also be 
considered. While all ethnic groups are entitled 
to one representative, they are also entitled to an 
additional representative for each one million 
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people. This means that the House is dominated 
by large ethnic groups (such as the Oromo and 
Amhara) and ethnically diverse regional states 
(such as the Southern Region). 
The weight of numbers arguably allows for unequal 
ethnic and regional representation overall, and it 
can undermine the perception of equal treatment 
by the House’s decisions, for example on issues 
such as inter-regional conflicts or the formula 
for federal-regional budget transfer. Entrusting 
constitutional review power to the judiciary rather 
than to a political body would not only benefit the 
management of the federal system, it would also 
strengthen the rule of law and create more effective 
mechanisms of human rights enforcement.
Conclusion
The EPRDF’s two decades of democratic centralist 
rule has allowed political mechanisms to patch 
up constitutional loop-holes that may otherwise 
have threatened the federation. At the same 
time, this political expedient has undermined 
the constitutional framework and affected the 
very objectives of the post-1991 EPRDF authored 
political settlement. The new assertiveness 
of the EPRDF constituent parties and the 
weakened federal-level cohesion will increase 
the practical importance of the constitutional 
provisions, while exposing their deficiencies. This 
calls for constitutional reforms to strengthen 
constitutionalism and the rule of law in the 
country. If current political trends persist, it will 
be necessary to design constitutional mechanisms 
offering a better balance between diversity and 
unity.
